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ABSTRACT	  
This text reports on a knowledge-broker implementation in the R&D function of a large 
firm. Results show that the knowledge-broker method created and diffused knowledge 
and that project managers appreciated it. At the same time, line managers were not that 
appreciative, and the method was eventually abandoned. 
We discuss the difficulty for knowledge sharing methods to be both efficient and 
legitimate, meaning that some methods would be okay by management, but they would 
not be efficient. Others would work, but management would be uncomfortable 
sponsoring them. We discuss whether this is caused by a divide between line 
management and the project organization. Then, we discuss how a different leadership 
style would influence the sharing of knowledge. 
Keywords: project management, organizational politics, knowledge broker 
1.	  INTRODUCTION	  
The development of new products or services is knowledge-intensive work, often 
performed by means of development projects. A common way to regard development 
projects is that they are the organizational entities that produce the design of the product 
or service; this viewpoint focus on what is delivered in the end. An alternative 
viewpoint would be that development projects are reducing uncertainty by creating the 
knowledge required to form a concrete project deliverable out of an abstract idea or 
concept (Nonaka, 1994). In this regard, development projects create knowledge. 
At a closer look, development projects don’t necessarily produce products or services. 
In manufacturing organizations where R&D is separated from production, development 
projects can be expected to produce specifications on how to manufacture the product. 
For instance, and in the context from where data is collected for our study, the 
pharmaceutical industry, a product development project would produce documentation 
on the description of the chemical formulation and the process of how to make a tablet 
out of it. A development project would also have produced a number of project process 
documents required to receive funding for further execution in the hosting company’s 
project stage model, or continued support from external clients and interest holders 
(Maylor, 2010). Thus, such development projects create knowledge and deliver it in 
form of documents. 
Considering this, a remarkable oddity is the reported inability of projects to capitalize 
on what is commonly called ‘lessons learned’ in other projects, and their inability to 
produce documents of their own lessons learned (Rhodes & Dawson, 2013). A number 
of inhibitors to the sharing of knowledge have been reported. For instance, Hinds and 
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Pfeffer categorize inhibitors into cognitive and motivational ones (2003); thus, there is a 
difference between project members not knowing what they have learnt, and project 
members not wanting to report what they have learnt. Successfully sharing knowledge 
would also require somebody wanting to learn, and some authors argue that the lack of 
motivation to receive lessons learned is in fact a greater obstacle than motivating 
experienced project members to tell what they have learned (e.g. Dixon, 1999). While 
some authors regard knowledge as a commodity that can be shared once it is 
externalized, other authors note that knowledge is power and that that quality would 
influence an organization’s ability to share it. In our literature review, we have found 
that much literature regard this power quality of knowledge management to be marginal, 
if at all mentioned. An exception where this issue is described to a somewhat larger 
extent is the comprehensive Wiley Guide to Managing Projects (Morris & Pinto, 2004), 
where a chapter of 16 pages is dedicated to the topic of project reviews. In this chapter, 
the author offers practitioners to follow “the best known rule of structured walk-
throughs” of projects – never to allow senior managers to attend project evaluations. 
Furthermore, its “rationale is obvious. How honest will project team members be in 
describing the problems they are encountering if the people who determine their salaries 
and career development are sitting in the room?” (Frame, 2004, p. 1207). To us, it 
reveals a paradox of organizational learning practice; ‘if my boss will learn about it, I 
won’t tell that I got the opportunity to learn’. Subordinates’ interests of opportunistic, 
secret-keeping behaviour has been described by organizational theorists (Downs, 1967; 
Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 1998) and researchers of organizational politics (Buchanan & 
Badham, 2008; Wickenberg & Kylén, 2007). However, perhaps this ‘rationale’ is not 
that obvious, as secret-keeping behaviour need to be covert in order to workup. We 
regret that Frame does not extend is observations to describe how the lessons learned 
should be kept from bosses’ eyes, or alternatively, how they can be turned into 
knowledge that does not threaten the self-interests of the project members.  
Also practitioners’ attitudes to knowledge sharing may be puzzling. Hellström et al 
(2001) reported on a case where a large software-developing firm happened to replace a 
database-centered approach to knowledge sharing between projects with one based on a 
human knowledge broker, finding that the latter was a much better-working solution 
when it comes to the amount and the quality of the information shared between projects. 
When we contacted that company as a preparation for our study, we found that the 
knowledge broker solution had been abandoned. We then contacted a number of the 
interviewees to find why the solution had not prevailed. They didn’t know why. 
Interestingly, none of those who had made career moves to other companies had made 
attempts to introduce the solution there. At the time, Hellström et al predicted that the 
power base of the knowledge broker would be difficult for management to accept. 
In line with the reasoning of self-interests presented by Hellström et al, and using the 
organizational learning theories of Argyris and Schön (1996), we further the 
investigation of power-sensitive knowledge sharing methods. We do this by exploring a 
case of a firm, where a knowledge sharing method was introduced in its multi-project 
based development organization. The knowledge-sharing method, here called PIA as an 
acronym for Project Initiation Audit, puts its emphasis not at the closing phase but the 
startup phase of projects, by encouraging newly appointed project managers actively 
investigating lessons learnt from others. PIA uses knowledge brokers who are instructed 
to put their emphasis on the sharing of relational skills including organizational politics. 
Similar to the case reported by Hellström et al (2001), the use of PIA was eventually 
abandoned, and no similar method replaced it. 
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2.	  LITERATURE	  OVERVIEW	  
2.1	  THE	  MANAGEMENT	  OF	  PROJECTS	  
There are abundant textbooks on how to better manage projects. Critics, including 
members of the so-called ‘Scandinavian School of project studies’ (Cicmil & Hodgson, 
2006, p. 116), argue that such normative textbooks over-emphasize process definitions 
aiming to standardize the repetitive components of project management. According to 
its critics, the normative textbook school of project management argues that project 
execution is to be monitored through the application of steering groups, reviews and toll 
gates, all designed to prevent the project from deviating from its plan, set within its trio 
of limits; i.e. time, resources and functionality (Engwall, 1995). Project managers are 
taught to put a heavy initial emphasis on the project’s scope and demarcations to 
prevent later deviations (Halman & Burger, 2002; Kreiner, 1995). 
However, unique work is difficult to standardize. The textbook school has been 
criticized for viewing projects as tools and not as organizations, thereby failing to 
recognize their ability to learn (Packendorff, 1995) and innovate (Ekvall, 2000; 
Hatchuel, Masson, & Weil, 2001). Innovation usually occurs during the design phase, 
which practitioners of project management have a tendency to rush past (van den 
Honert, 1992; Turner & Cochrane, 1993). A few mechanistic approaches have been 
applied to the design phase; the stage-gate model was designed to prevent premature 
commitment to designs which have not been sufficiently appraised (Cooper, 1988; 
Hosking & Morley, 1991). Some design decisions may nevertheless have to be based on 
uncertain grounds when stage-gate meetings turn into arenas not for information-
sharing but for impression-making (Cooper, 1999). Bad decisions made early on during 
the execution of a project are unfortunately difficult to change, since the decision-
makers tend to stick more rigidly to the chosen path after a serious investment has been 
made (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1981). Hellgren and Stjernberg (1995) found that the 
initial design phase of important projects is “fuzzy” and hard to capture, as opposed to 
the implementation phase, which is of a more hierarchical and plannable nature. In fact, 
Nobelius and Trygg (2002) argue that there is little use in trying to standardize the 
design phase, and that there is a need for more managerial flexibility during this phase. 
Olin and Wickenberg (2001) found that project managers of new product development 
projects might need to take some political action in order for their projects to be 
successful; they need to navigate their projects past obstacles created by the 
administration of their own companies.  
In conclusion, critics of the textbook school of project management argue that it is of 
little use to apply the mechanistic formal planning approach to the early phases of 
projects (Hellgren & Stjernberg, 1995; Nobelius & Trygg, 2002), and that managing 
uncertainty, through mastering the politics of the project context, is the essential thing 
for the project’s, and the project manager’s, success (Buchanan & Badham, 2008). This 
would call for project methods which aid project managers to become rapid learners in a 
context characterized by technological and organizational uncertainty, and which would 
recognize the project manager as an actor in a network of different interest holders. 
2.2	  Managing	  learning	  in	  and	  between	  projects	  
Using the categorization of Hinds and Pfeffer (2003) above, we divide inhibitors into 
cognitive and motivational ones; project members may not know what they have learnt, 
and project members may not want to report what they have learnt. Another 
categorization is the main directionality of knowledge sharing; that is, a project member 
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receiving knowledge learnt by others, or offering to share knowledge learnt to others 
(Dixon, 1999; Roth, 2002). 
An explanation for Hinds and Pfeffer’s cognitive inhibitor to learning is to be found in 
Argyris and Schön’s theories on organizational learning (1978). According to this, we 
humans do not fully see things as they are in actuality. One reason for this distortion of 
reality is that the external stimuli recognized by our senses are compared to schemas 
(action theories) stored in our memories; the appropriate perception of the schema 
suddenly pops into our awareness. Like a theory, a schema embodies assumptions, 
which we take as givens with complete confidence. This lets us make interpretations 
that outstrip the immediate evidence from our senses. This cognitive shorthand lets us 
navigate our way through the ambiguity which we confront in the world (Goleman, 
1986). One important area of distortion is our own actions. Argyris and Schön call our 
view of how we act espoused theories and how we really act theories-in-use. The 
distortion, i.e. the difference between the espoused theories and the theories-in-use, is 
greater under some circumstances than others. While day-to-day work creates a low 
level of distortion, it is increased by uncertain issues which are embarrassing or 
threatening. Distortion creates a dilemma; on the one hand, we don’t want to be 
immobilized by giving too much attention to our actions, while on the other, our actions 
are likely to be ineffective. The irony is that we are usually more aware of other 
people’s inconsistencies while they are producing them, and we are aware that they are 
unaware. According to this theory, we are regrettably not particularly effective in 
helping others to gain awareness, as we are unaware of our own ineffectiveness while 
trying to be of help (Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, 1985).  
Members of organizations are prevented from learning because of defensive reasoning 
and routines, especially occurring during threatening situations (Argyris, 1990). This 
way of thinking includes the three action values; seek to be in unilateral control, win, 
and do not upset people. These strategies, which Argyris labels Model I reasoning, are 
often enacted in a quick and skilled way, making its actors unaware of what is going on 
and preventing any inquiry which could have created a better understanding. Luckily, 
there are remedies. To support learning, actors need to replace Model I reasoning with 
Model II reasoning, which consists of two action strategies; advocate your position and 
encourage inquiry or confirmation of it (by making public the reasoning that led us to 
our standpoint), and minimize our face-saving of others (thereby increasing feedback on 
distortion). Thus; Argyris’ argument is that if we can create a climate where we can 
abandon Model I reasoning in favour of Model II, we will better be able to help each 
other reduce distortion, i.e. our understanding of which actions we really perform, 
thereby increasing the efficiency of our actions.  
Several methods have been developed based on learning through reflection. In Action 
science a mentor supports a group of subjects in analysing past social events in order to 
increase reflection upon what has occurred and help them develop alternative actions in 
such situations (Argyris et al., 1985). Action science is criticized for, among other 
things, exposing participants and making them vulnerable following intervention 
(Kemmis & McTaggart, 2000). Ollila (2000) describes an application of a reflective 
coaching method, Reflective Project Leadership, based on Schön (1991), where the 
actions of a project manager are questioned by an observer. Ollila reports that initially 
the responses of the project manager are swift, but after a few sessions, he starts to 
reflect upon why he is taking certain actions. The observer refuses to give any kind of 
advice, instead the manager is asked to reflect upon why certain actions triggered 
certain responses from other actors. Reflective Project Leadership aims to create 
reflection using the non-initiated observer as a catalyst. However, reflection does not 
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necessarily require interaction with other people; the writing of self-reflective journals 
is one example of such a method (Loo & Thorpe, 2002).  
3.	  METHOD	  
The purpose of the empirical study was to investigate how the PIA method deals with 
the following; (i) is there a need for reflection regarding the items of the project 
manager’s two agendas; (ii) do project managers accept the support of the PIA auditor 
and is Model II reasoning achieved, and (iii) will management deploy PIAs? The data 
collection method was semi-structured interviews of seven project managers and five 
line managers in the organization where PIAs were deployed. Three project audits and a 
self-narrative were recorded. Six of the interviews were performed by another 
researcher who interpreted the data together with the author. A survey was conducted 
by management at the case company to benchmark the PIA method; its results are 
reported here.  
Validation of the interview process, i.e. investigating whether the collected data and its 
analysis were reliable, was done in three steps. The interviews included questions 
regarding the validity of the interview series, and this data was analysed for its manifest 
content, again using the same procedure as when analysing the research questions. The 
second step was analysing the interview process itself. The author took on the role of 
insider/colleague (Bartunek & Louis, 1996; Roth, Sandberg, & Svensson, 2004) and 
listened from the beginning to the end of all the recorded interviews while asking 
himself the question; ’do I believe these responses from this interviewee not to be 
coloured by my own involvement’. Finally, the interpretations were scrutinized by two 
fellow researchers.  
4.	  FINDINGS	  
4.1	  The	  case	  company	  and	  the	  PIA	  method	  
The method was developed in the IT function at an R&D unit (the Company) of a 
corporation. The Company has grown from 1,000 to 2,000 employees over the seven 
years during which the method was in use. Of these employees, between 70 and 160 
have been working in the IT departments. About 80 PIAs have been performed in 
collaboration with about 50 different project managers, of whom about a tenth have 
been contracted consultants. 
According to its developer, the PIA method aimed on giving project managers a 
possibility to reason and reflect upon all issues of their projects, including those that 
cannot be discussed openly. The basic idea was to create a dialogue climate where 
errors or obstacles can be discussed without loss of face or performance of 
organizational politics. The PIA method was described in company-internal documents 
with the following characteristics: 
1. Is sponsored by the CIO and his management team 
2. Supplements existing quality assurance for project management 
3. Is performed twice during the duration of each project; once during the early 
phase, and once during the closing phase (note: during the pilot reported upon in 
Table 1, it was only performed during the early phase of each project) 
4. Takes less than two hours to perform 
5. Staged for two participants; the project manager and the auditor  
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6. Unilaterally confidential (the auditor cannot disclose project-specific 
information to others) 
7. The auditor is powerless and non-influential outside the PIAs  
8. Aims at increasing project performance by enabling lessons learned between 
projects and improving risk management. 
There is a difference between the two records of the aim; as it was told by the PIA 
developer, and as it was described (8) in the company-internal document. Interestingly, 
the latter was written the very same person. The PIA developer calls the former aim the 
‘actual’ one, and the latter aim the ‘formal’ one. He believes he would not had been 
successful receiving management support for the method had he used the actual aim as 
the formal one. Secret-keeping seems, however, to have been done in agreement with 
line management. They did sponsor the method, and remarkably, the CIO of the 
Company publically supported the unilateral confidentiality of PIA, by instructing his 
reporting line managers to never make inquiries what their project managers were 
discussing during the PIA audits. 
According to the PIA designer, the unilateral confidentially is core to the design of PIA, 
as it prevents the PIA auditor from sharing with others his observations of the project 
and its project manager, and leaves the project manager in full power to manage such 
impressions. This unilateral confidentially comes with a twist. It regards information of 
a level of detail that would make it possible to identify the project or its project manager. 
Thus, the PIA auditor wrote periodical reports on overall observations of the projects 
made during the PIAs. These reports were distributed to the CIO and his management 
team, as well as the project managers of the Company. 
4.2	  The	  Company’s	  pilot	  evaluation	  of	  PIA	  
After the expiry of its first two years of evaluation, management investigated the 
performance of the PIAs using a simple survey consisting of three questions (see Table 
1). The questionnaire was sent to those IT project managers who had experienced PIAs 
and who answered the call made by the administrator performing the study. Fourteen 
project managers were absent or failed to answer the call. Of those who answered the 
call, all responded to the questionnaire. 
Table 1 - Project managers' perception of PIA (# of respondents) 
 
Management interpreted this result as positive and institutionalised PIA to be run during 
the initiation of all IT projects. 
The interview series shows that management is supportive of PIAs. One manager said 
that he authorized PIAs because they give project managers a second chance; project 
managers are “often flattered” when they are offered a new project and this prevents 
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them from scrutinizing their project properly. PIAs provide an opportunity for newly 
appointed project managers to better reflect upon the feasibility of the project idea. The 
manager said that a bad project concept would be easier to reject or improve if the 
project manager would hear the auditor say ‘this project would be hard to conduct for 
anybody’. 
The interviewed line managers explained their support of PIAs in terms of its ability to 
create reflection and support the project managers during the important early phase of a 
project. Most managers mentioned that they trusted the project managers; one of them 
put it like this: 
I believe the employees try to do their best, and if [PIAs] are an unconventional 
way of helping them, well then I think it is a good idea to carry out [PIAs], 
compared to formal audits. [... Formal audits] make people feel scrutinized and 
they are not perceived as supportive. Helping the projects is what it’s all about. In 
the end, everything is about improving our results, our projects. 
4.3	  The	  auditor’s	  view	  of	  PIA	  
According to the PIA auditor, the typical PIA is initiated by the project manager, who 
contacts the PIA auditor to make an appointment for an audit sometime during the 
initial weeks following the assignment of the project. During that call, the auditor 
makes sure that the project manager is informed as regards how a PIA is performed, 
also asking for any documents describing the project. The common document for this 
purpose is called ‘Project Description’, which states the name of the client ordering the 
project, the purpose and effects of the project together with the proposed staffing, and 
descriptions of identified dependencies and project risks. 
Before the meeting, the PIA auditor reviews the documents and makes marginal notes 
of obscurities as well as the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the project initiative. 
When the audit starts, the auditor makes sure that the project manager is aware of the 
purpose of the audit and that the auditor is subject to unilateral confidentiality. The 
purpose of the audit is to improve the project manager’s awareness of the characteristics 
of the project assignment by means of exposing the proposed project (and program) 
design to the different perspectives of another mind. In order to do this effectively, the 
auditor mainly focuses on the potential weaknesses of the project design. 
The project manager is asked to describe what is happening as regards the project. This 
description usually takes between five and twenty minutes and covers most of the 
project description document. The auditor will listen for cues concerning any problems 
or worries which the project manager has regarding the project. 
From this point on, there is no standard flow of dialogue. Two paths are eventually 
trodden; the auditor will investigate the concerns of the project manager, and elucidate 
any remaining concerns of his/her own. Only sometimes do these paths cross. 
According to the auditor, he tries to strike a balance between inquiry and advocacy, 
depending on the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the project manager. The 
overall purpose of all inquiry is to allow the project manager to reflect over each 
important design decision, and that he/she has identified a few alternatives for each 
major choice. Occasionally, the project manager has already reflected and is well aware 
of the alternatives. At other times, the project manager has not reflected, sticking to 
taken-for-granted project designs. Reflection is created through questioning the chosen 
path and comparing it with other possible paths (“Tell me why you chose... What will 
happen if ... Have you considered ... “) 
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Concerns raised by the project manager are usually obstacles to project initiation or, 
more frequently, project execution, e.g. “How can I get them to understand that...” or 
“A member of the steering committee is resisting my project...”. Typical concerns of the 
auditor include the overall project design, dependencies, risk management, and most 
importantly, if there is ‘a bias to the concerns of the project manager’, thus if there are 
areas of interest which the project manager has not considered. 
According to the auditor, the intention of the unilateral secrecy of the PIAs is twofold. 
Its intention is to encourage project managers to be honest about the state of their 
projects and to avoid any embarrassment. It also seeks to improve innovation; any idea 
that is created during an audit can be used by the project manager as his/her own, 
regardless of which of the participants invented it. The secrecy is unilateral in that the 
project manager can conclude any part of the audit at his/her own discretion.  
I remember an audit when the project manager and I tried to figure out what the 
customer of this process-change project really wanted the project to do. It took us 
almost half an hour of analysing the project directives to realize that there was no 
reasonable deliverable to provide. The project customer had provided a text of 
management mumbo-jumbo that initially fooled us both. The project manager 
returned to the customer with the argument that neither of us could find a 
meaningful path for running the project. I think that this would have been a less 
pleasant message to deliver, had the project manager lacked support from 
another person. [… Also,] the fact that PIAs are institutionalised may help us to 
avoid embarrassment here; the project manager has not asked anybody for a 
second opinion, but has been forced into it. 
The confidentiality is not necessarily needed to keep secrets but help disarm 
defensiveness: 
You could say that most of the things we talk about could be made public, things 
which wouldn’t embarrass or hurt anyone. But I think that the overall 
confidentiality is one reason why project managers let go of their defensiveness 
and end their attempts to make a good impression. Only a few project managers 
have discussed things clearly needing to be kept secret from people outside of the 
project, for the overall good of the project. But there is a grey zone of topics 
which are not necessary to keep secret but which would cause a stir if they 
became public, e.g. how to handle relations with those in power and how to 
persuade hesitant people to support the project. […] And, of course, most project 
managers seem to maintain a can-do image. 
It seems that it is of importance that PIA is an arena set for two persons: 
Three times, project managers have brought a project member to the PIA with 
bad results. I remember the first time – the audit turned into a disaster. It was the 
only time the discussion became argumentative, when we ended up arguing, 
defending our positions. The project manager and I have collaborated well, both 
before and after this incident, so it was not about a clash of personalities. I think 
the presence of a third person set the scene for a battle of pride, both his and mine. 
I thought a lot about that afterwards and discussed the matter with the project 
manager – in private, this time. The other two times when there was a third 
person present, I took the opportunity of checking that I would not repeat the 
mistakes of the first incident. [The PIAs] didn’t work despite this, however. Face-
saving behaviour by the project manager was evident, and no arenas for 
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reflection were created. One of these projects was critical, and I proposed a 
follow-up audit for that. It didn’t work, either. The project manager was a hired 
consultant whom I didn’t know, and the face-saving pattern set during our first 
meeting continued into the next. Perhaps she learnt something behind that 
professional face, perhaps not. I think it was the latter, as [I later heard that] the 
project did not develop to its full potential. 
The	  project	  managers’	  view	  of	  PIA	  
Audited project managers responded that PIAs had ’worked’ for them by ’helping’ them 
in their projects. They were all upbeat about the existence of PIAs. However, when they 
were asked an open question regarding the purpose of PIAs, the answers varied. One 
respondent said that the purpose of PIAs is to “let you discuss your ideas and get help in 
writing up the requirements specification before starting the project. It’s to give you a 
green light, that everything is okay.” Another person responded, “it’s to avoid risks, to 
avoid forgetting things”. One answer was “to get the chance to clarify things with a 
neutral person, checking that you have put some thought into it, somebody neutral who 
is not involved”. Another said “it’s to get another pair of eyes to look at the project 
specification and see things you have forgotten, for example missing risks, missing 
dependencies, or the project in its entirety, to question the different components of your 
project”. 
The Company has a rule that all IT projects should have a steering group which the 
project manager reports to. This rule has been in place for several years. Respondents 
were asked if PIAs offered the projects a different service to the one offered by the 
steering group. One project manager said that both timing and prestige were essential. 
[PIAs] have a different purpose [compared to] the steering group. You can avoid 
the matter of prestige, the necessity of having to show the steering group that you 
have put a lot of thought into it, that you’re clever, and in a situation like that [in 
front of the steering group] you don’t want to expose logical errors, mental errors, 
etc. 
The respondent said that her experience of steering groups is that they usually lack 
knowledge of IT product development in general, and of the situation at hand. The fact 
that the steering group consists of several people, where many are unknown to you and 
few have a good insight into the situation creates the dilemma. 
It is crucial how you create the project’s steering group. Problems in the steering 
of my projects have often stemmed from a lack of commitment in the steering 
groups. The purpose of steering groups is to make way for the project, to allow 
you to work without interruption, to create acceptance for the project, to obtain 
more resources. [...] They are to give guidance regarding a change of path and so 
on. If unexpected events occur forcing you to rethink or redirect, then they are the 
ones to make that decision. 
Another respondent said that there are typical situations when project managers don’t 
inform the steering group of what’s going on. 
The same old same old, you have a deadline that you don’t believe in, or other 
problems you don’t want to reveal to the steering group. Times when you want 
[them to have only] a limited view of the project. Project managers always expose 
only some of the perspectives of their projects to others, including their steering 
groups. [...] This [selection of perspectives] does not in itself imply deceit, as a 
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project manager simply cannot show the steering group the image of the whole 
project, it’s impossible. 
One respondent focused on the need for agreement: 
One difference between a review such as this and a steering group is that you 
have to reach agreement with your steering group. The steering group is 
something you have to obey, but in respect of a review such as this, that is not the 
case. [...] A steering group is not as questioning, they never ask ’why did you 
choose to put this activity before that one’, or ’why did you choose these three 
objects of delivery’. [The PIA auditor] can be provocative in a review such as this, 
forcing the project manager to explain his/her decisions, and you don’t have to 
reach agreement about it. I say it is of more use to you, as the project manager, to 
have to think carefully. 
One respondent said that the purpose of PIAs was to “check the use of ideas” and “get 
help in writing the requirements specification before starting the project”. When asked 
later on if PIAs had worked, she answered that they had: 
Sometimes you are so focused on what you are supposed to do. You are so 
focused on satisfying the customer, and that can lead to forgetting some things. 
[...] If you don’t have a standard, and you have to start from scratch, during every 
project start-up, you tend to care about what comes to mind, to include this and 
that and then you might forget some other things. [...] You remember what went 
wrong earlier, but you forget to identify the things that went well. 
5.	  DISCUSSION	  
Apart from the PIA method, the project management structures put in place at the 
investigated case company to guide its projects are ‘textbook’, and thus legitimate: 
specialized project managers, matrix organizing, a documented project process designed 
around a stage-gate core, and a project management support office including quality 
assurance inspections (Maylor, 2010; Pinto, 2013). 
Of these standardized tools and methods, the organizing of stage-gates run by steering 
groups is of particular interest, as they are group of people who has formal power over a 
project. They are also a stakeholder group who the project manager actually will face. 
The project managers in this study disclose that they at times act dishonestly, when they 
do not reveal relevant facts to their steering groups. Other project managers candidly 
report that you ‘dress things up’ in front of the steering group, trying to present a more 
polished picture of your project, at least up to the point of running into trouble when 
you inform them in order to make them act.  
Perhaps there is a particular lack of rapport between steering groups and project 
managers at the case company? Lack of honesty in stage-gate processes has been 
reported from other companies (Chao, Lichtendahl, & Grushka-Cockayne, 2012) and it 
is known that successful project managers learn how to bend the rules to make sure that 
their projects succeed (Olin & Wickenberg, 2001; Ollila, 2002). Also, this is not limited 
to project managers. We expect to see self-serving interests to some extent influencing 
behaviour also outside projects (including members of steering groups). 
Proponents of stage-gate systems may object that the tool works all right, but that its 
positive effect is inhibited by the political behaviour of the project managers. We 
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acknowledge that the stage-gate system is an important tool (as indicated by its wide-
spread implementation) and argue that an analysis of important tools should include 
habitual patterns of use and misuse. Thus, if a tool is prone to misuse, it can be 
considered a quality of the tool. 
What makes this case interesting is perhaps not that the project managers admit to lack 
of rapport before the people officially set to support them in their steering groups. It is 
the contrast, between low rapport in one organizational context (steering group 
meetings), and high rapport in another (PIA audits). It seems the Company was 
successful in creating an efficient, high-rapport arena with the design of the PIA for 
stimulating learning and knowledge transfer in the early phases of projects. 
It is of interest to chisel out the circumstances required to enable project-based 
organizations to enhance Model II reasoning (Argyris, 1990). The PIA auditor’s 
reporting of failures during audits when three people were present, and the criticism of 
Action Science’s group counselling (Kemmis & McTaggart, 2000) indicate that a one-
on-one setting is preferable. One-on-one project audits, other than PIAs, have been 
occurring at the Company for years. The focus of those audits, however, has been 
compliance, with project managers aware that those audits would disclose any project 
which did not, in the end, comply. We can expect employees to be unwilling to share 
information that puts them in a bad light (Downs, 1967), and, under such threatening 
audits, it is naïve to believe that deeper, double-loop learning would occur, regardless of 
the ambitions of the auditor. These findings are in line with the results of Westling’s 
(2002) investigation of different kinds of project meetings in a large multinational 
organization, where he found them to more be arenas for impression management and 
the practice of symbolic leadership rather than information-sharing and decision-making. 
Instead, much of the information-sharing and decision-making takes place backstage. 
Thus, we cannot expect Model II reasoning to occur during steering group meetings or 
during disclosing audits. Those arenas are not staged for learning, but for performance.  
Unchallenging model I reasoning and single-loop learning is the dominant mode when 
struggling through the workday. Double-loop learning, changing the reasoning behind 
your actions, is time and energy consuming, challenging, and at times hurtful. 
Dialogues during the PIAs sometimes cover sensitive topics such as what people have 
said, what people have done, and what you are to make of that. Project managers reveal 
what they think of others and what they think of their own actions. They allow 
themselves to be challenged, and, at times, this reflection causes a clearly identifiable 
change of action by the project manager. Model II reasoning allows reflection and 
double-loop learning to occur.  
Management did (obviously) deploy PIA. Their explanation for the decision is the need 
to support project managers during the early project phase; just why conventional 
project management methods are unsuited to providing this support is not elaborated 
upon. The attitude of management can be characterized thus; ‘The PIA is a bit strange, 
and was not my idea, but as long as the project managers say it works, it’s fine by me’. 
This finding supports the proposal that management is reluctant to admit to any 
difference of interests in the projects and their environment. This could in turn be 
caused by the tradition of viewing the organization as a rational design. Management 
says it trusts project managers to be loyal, which is probably a prerequisite for the 
deployment of a method such as PIA, which unilaterally increase learning through 
reflection.  
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Again, the project managers found the PIAs to be supportive with the survey indicating 
that PIAs increased the project managers’ understanding of their projects. The 
interviewed project managers viewed the PIA as an opportunity to double-check the 
project design before it was scrutinized by the other project management support 
systems, e.g. the steering group and the quality audits. Obviously, the project managers 
see a need to control what is perceived by these conventional, legitimate support 
systems. Some project managers gave examples of how they needed to manage the 
impressions of the project.  
The PIA auditor reported that reflecting did not provide much ‘pay off’ as regards the 
detailed planning of the project, but was much needed as regards the initial proposal 
received from the customer and the overall design of the project. The PIA auditor also 
reported some occurrences of projects that got stuck early on when the project managers 
recognized political opposition from unfriendly interest owners inside the Company. 
Following reflection, these project managers realised that they could either fight back 
politically or expose the resistance, two tactics that had not been considered before the 
audits. More than just a few project managers seem to perceive occurrences of political 
resistance and other kinds of non-supportive behaviour as kinds of organizational bugs, 
and that these bugs must be fixed by management before project work can continue. 
The possibility of finding a temporary workaround was reflected upon when situations 
like these were discussed.  
This study supports the existence of the objective inside versus the subjective outside 
paradox in the management of projects. It also indicates that reflection through Model II 
reasoning can be formally organized, if this organization recognizes the paradox and the 
need for the trust required for Model II. The existence of the paradox has implications 
for designers of any kind of control system for project management; the project 
managers, who are subject to the control system, will try to manage how the control 
system perceives the project.  
Perhaps the setting of The Company is peculiar; perhaps it all would be different in an 
organization where steering groups are manned to a greater extent by people skilled in 
project management. We believe the Company is not that peculiar. A project manager 
cannot always expect the context of his/her project to be supportive and predictable. 
Some irrationality will always exist, e.g. organizational politics in competition for scant 
resources, uncertainty regarding the interpretation of top management directives, or 
rivalry between line and project managers. PIAs are an example of a project 
management method, which enables reflection and learning by project managers as 
regards such matters. Conventional project management methods, such as guidance by 
steering groups and knowledge stored in rules and guidelines, have failed to provide 
such support.  
Our findings show that the practice of learning an knowledge sharing in project 
management is better served by an understanding of the interests of the different actors 
of the organization, and the recognition that the interests of individuals deviates at times 
from the overall goals of the organization. It proposes that learning arenas may be 
served by reducing the influence of the traditional hierarchical system of power. Project 
managers are aware of the informal power systems. So should also the designers of 
management methods.  
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